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Where Else Is the Appearance of Corruption
Protected by the Constitution?
A Comparative Analysis of Campaign
Finance Laws After Citizens United and
McCutcheon
by VLADYSLAV DEMBITSKIY*

Introduction
In September 1988, a jury convicted a West Virginia state legislator,
Robert McCormick, of corruption-misusing political power to extort
money. 1 McCormick had long been the voice for a group of foreign
doctors in West Virginia by supporting legislation that would enable these
doctors to practice medicine in the state. After realizing that his re-election
campaign was becoming expensive, McCormick called the lobbyist who
represented foreign doctors about how he was running low on campaign
cash. The lobbyist reasonably responded that he would contact the doctors
to see what he could do. The lobbyist then summoned the doctors,
collected a few thousand dollars in cash, and delivered it to McCormick.
After receiving the money, McCormick sponsored state legislation in favor
of the foreign doctors. Two weeks after the legislation was enacted,
McCormick collected another cash payment from the doctors. Although
the jury decided that McCormick abused his power, 3 the Supreme Court
disagreed and overturned McCormick's conviction. The Court also
overturned the law that criminalized McCormick's conduct, holding that a
campaign contribution is not a bribe without the so-called "quid pro quo"

*

J.D. Candidate, May 2016, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. The

author is grateful to the editors of the Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly for their patience
and hard work.
1. United States v. McCormick, 896 F.2d 61,64 (4th Cir. 1990).
2. McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257, 260-61 (1991).
3. ld. at 262.
[885]
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requirement.4 The Court held that corruption occurs only when the
prosecutor can prove that money was paid in exchange for an explicit
promise to unduly influence the government.5 The Court's decision caused
because it blessed campaign finance tactics that appeared
much outrage
6
corrupt.
Twenty-five years later, there is even more outrage about campaign
finance, and the decisions from Citizens United and McCutcheon8 were the
most condemned for making the United States elections appear more
corrupt. In both of these decisions, the Supreme Court used the First
Amendment freedom of speech protection to shield large political
contributions from government regulation. One writer for the New York
Times compared the Court's holding to defending the right to market junk
food to children. 9 Another writer cautioned that the combination of the two
decisions further blurred the line between campaign finance and quid pro
quo bribery.' 0 Yet another columnist highlighted that the combination of
the Citizens United and McCutcheon decisions "will further inundate a
political system already flush with cash, marginalize average voters, and
elevate those who can afford to buy political access."'"
But how do the United States corruption laws compare to those of
other countries? Do our laws really support corruption and abuse, as critics
suggest? This note aims to discover where the United States campaign
finance laws post-Citizens United and McCutcheon stand in the
international arena.
A.

Corruption and Bribery Per Se

Bribery per se is not an issue here because traditional bribery is
The meaning of
defined and penalized uniformly across the globe.
4.

Id. at 263.

5.

Id.
6. In Dirty Deals? An Encyclopedia ofLobbying, Political Influence and Corruption, Amy
Handlin characterizes the McCormick decision as one that paved the way for corruption in the
United States. See generally AMY HANDLIN, DIRTY DEALS? AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LOBBYING,
POLITICAL INFLUENCE AND CORRUPTION (2014).

Citizens United v. FEC, 510 U.S. 310 (2010).
McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014).
(Apr. 14, 2014),
9. Mark Bittman, Why Care About McCutcheon, N.Y. TIMES
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/23/opinion/bittman-why-carc-about-mccutcheon.html?_r=O.
10. Brendan Fischer, What Corruption? McCutcheon Reveals Absurdity of Citizens United,
7.
8.

THE

CENTER

FOR MEDIA

AND

DEMOCRACY'S

PR WATCH

(Apr.

3,

2014,

1:50

PM),

http://www.prwatch.org/news/2014/04/12438/mccutcheon.
11. Supreme Court's McCutcheon Decision Is a Blow Against Average Voters, BRENNAN
CENTER FOR JUSTICE (Apr. 2, 2014), http://www.brennancenter.org/press-release/supreme-courtsmccutcheon-decision-blow-against-averagc-voters.
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traditional bribery is not subject to debate. The members of the United
Nations Convention Against Corruption ("UNCAC") define a "bribe" as
the "undue advantage" that is intentionally offered to a government official
"[to] act or refrain from acting in the exercise of his or her official
duties." 12 UNCAC is a binding international anticorruption instrument that
has been adopted by 173 countries, including the United States and the
European Union. 13 The UNCAC has standardized the definition of a
traditional bribe across the globe. Now the elements of traditional bribery
are the same everywhere, and the conduct of buying political favors is
punished worldwide. Defining per se bribery therefore is not an issue after
UNCAC.
However, UNCAC fails to clearly define "lobbying" and "private
campaign financing," the most prevalent manifestations of legal corruption.
Laws regulating lobbying and campaign finance are not uniform and deal
with the intricate concept of "appearance of corruption," where money is
not given under the table but in plain sight under the scrutiny of the legal
system. These laws are at the forefront of the debate on corruption after
Citizens

United and

McCutcheon,

making

these

decisions

very

controversial. Accordingly, this note will compare campaign finance laws
across the globe to discover exactly how corrupt the United States appears
to be after the two debatable decisions.
B.

Appearance of Corruption

Appearance of corruption stems from the presence of big money in
politics. It is not corruption per se because campaign contributions are
legal. But political victories fueled by large donations of the rich minority
do not appear fair because they make the votes of the poor majority seem
worthless. Some developing countries offer extreme examples of why the
presence of big money in politics feels corrupt.
For example, in Brazil, the candidate who gets corporate money wins
the election. Dilma Rosouff won the Brazilian presidential election in 2010
after getting 98% of her campaign funds from large corporations. 4 In fact,
corporations donated 99.04% of all money spent in the country's most
12.

U.N. Secretary General, United Nations Convention Against Corruption,art. 15, sec. (a)

& (b) (2004).
13. Action Against Corruption & Economic Crime, U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME,
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/cn/corruption/index.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2016); United Nations
Convention against Corruption Signature & Ratification Status as of I December 2015, U.N.
OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/signatories.html (last

visited Apr. 7, 2016).
14.

Nick Thompson, InternationalCampaign Finance: How do Countries Compare?, CNN

(Mar. 5, 2012, 4:54 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/01/24/world/global-campaign-finance/.
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populous state of Sdo Paolo.15 That is appearance of corruption: big money
gets big power and appears to rule the government. Laws protecting
corporate donations allow that to happen.
In Nigeria, there are no limits on how much money a candidate can
spend on campaigning.' 6 "[It is] an electoral system where you need to
spend" in order to win. 17 This is the appearance of corruption: big money
is necessary to obtain power, and the voices of the poor appearto drown in
the dollars of the rich. Laws allowing for unlimited donations and
expenditures allow this to happen.
After the Citizens United and McCutcheon decisions, U.S. campaign
finance laws were compared to those of Brazil and Nigeria,' 8 both of which
are developing economies known for widespread corruption. While this
comparison is alarming, it is not proper. The United States has one of the
most developed legal systems in the world, and it should be compared to
similarly situated legal systems, some of which are in the European Union.
Accordingly, it is reasonable to compare the laws regulating the
appearance of corruption in the United States (after the decisions of
Citizens United and McCutcheon) to that of France and the United
Kingdom, as well as other European countries. While the Supreme Court's
decision to protect corporate contributions and legalize unlimited
expenditures is not ideal, it is also not far from the reality of other countries
in the developed world. The decisions of Citizens United and McCutcheon
are therefore not as wild and unprecedented as the critics claim them to be.

I. Campaign Finance Laws in the United States After Citizens
United and McCutcheon
Citizens United and McCutcheon focused on the appearance of
corruption resulting from political campaign contributions. The Court
extended First Amendment political speech protection to campaign
The only
contributions, overlooking the appearance of corruption.
corruption the Court wanted to prevent was "quid pro quo corruption,"
defined as requiring the proof of traditional bribery to penalize any form of
corruption. As a result of these cases, a plaintiff claiming that big money
in politics appears corrupt will most likely lose the suit because the Court
heightened the standard on campaign finance. But these two decisions did

15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18.

Id.
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not create this law out of thin air. The forty-year-old precedent of Buckley
19
v. Valeo shaped the discussion in both Citizens United and McCutcheon.
A.

The Buckley Precedent

In Buckley, the Court looked at laws limiting direct contributions to
political candidates and independent political expenditures. The limit on
direct contributions prohibited individuals from giving more than $1,000 to
a single candidate or more than $25,000 to all candidates in one election
year.
The limit on independent expenditures, on the other hand,
prohibited spending more than $1,000 a year "relative to a clearly
identified candidate.",2' The Court upheld the direct-contribution limit but
struck down the spending limit.
The Buckley Court relied on the First Amendment to protect the use of
money in politics.

2

The Court provided campaign financing with the same

constitutional protection as political speech because funneling money to
candidates apparently facilitated "discussion of government affairs...
including discussion among candidates. 2 3 Supporting a candidate of one's
choice was also considered an association with the candidate or party,
which is a separate source of the First Amendment protection. 4 Thus, the
perception of corruption within campaign finance is reviewed under a high
freedom of speech bar in the United States. 5 Buckley made it very hard to
scrutinize questionable campaign finance practices, like the one presented
in the McCormick's case.
While viewing the limit on direct contributions as a limit on the
freedom of association, 26 the Buckley Court still upheld the restriction out

19. Buckley v. Valco, 424 U.S. I (1976); see, e.g., MeCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434,
1451 (2014) ("The definition of corruption we apply today.., has firm roots in Buckley itself.").
20. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 13.
21. Id.(quoting the statute).
22. Id. at 14 (holding that "contribution and expenditure limitations operate in the area of
the most fundamental First Amendment activities" (emphasis added)).
23. Id. (quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214,218 (1966)).
24. Id. at 15 (holding that the First Amendment "encompasses the right to associate with a
political party of one's choice").
25. See id. at 19 ("A restriction on the amount of money a person or group can spend on
political communication during a campaign necessarily reduces the quantity of expression by
restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of the
audience reached. This is because virtually every means of communicating ideas in today's mass
society requires expenditure of money."). Governmental "action which may have the effect of
curtailing the freedom to associate is subject to closest scrutiny." NAACP v. Ala. ex rel.
Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460-61 (1958) (emphasis added).
26. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 24.
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27

Against the First Amendment
of fear of the appearance of corruption.
backdrop, the Court reviewed the limit on direct contributions under strict
scrutiny. Appellants argued that direct contributions did not appearcorrupt
because there was no "proven or suspected quid pro quo arrangement,"
which is an element of corruption per se.2 s The Court, however, refuted the
appellants' position, and acknowledged that proving a quid pro quo
arrangement is too high of a bar to show merely the appearance of
corruption.2 9
The Court thus identified actual corruption and the appearance of
corruption as two separate categories, holding that preventing both types of
corruption served a significant governmental interest. 30 The public
perceived large contributions as a means to "secure a political quid pro
quo," which undermines the integrity of a democratic political system,
analogous to traditional bribery. 31 At the time of Buckley, polls revealed
that 69.9% of Americans thought that the U.S. government was primarily
advancing the interests of a rich minority. 32 The Court then addressed this
public concern by upholding the limit on per-candidate
direct contributions
33
as a measure to prevent appearance of corruption.
The Buckley Court, however, struck down the limitation on political
expenditures in favor of a candidate. The ceiling on political expenditures,
characterized as a "loophole-closing provision,, 34 prevented contributors
from indirectly paying a candidate's bills by advocating in an individual
capacity on the candidate's behalf. In other words, the provision limited
how much a person can sponsor the candidate without directly giving cash
to the candidate. The Court held that limiting how much a person can
spend on a candidate, such as paying for election-related advertisements,
unnecessarily burdened the freedom of speech.35 While ignoring the
27.
28.
29.
the most
30.

Id.at 29.
Id. at 27.
Id. at 27-28 ("[L]aws making criminal the giving and taking of bribes deal with only
blatant and specific attempts of those with money to influence governmental action.").
Id.at 27.

31. Id. at 26.
32. See Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 839 n.34 (D.D.C. 1975). Additional research
revealed the milk industry contributing $2 million to Nixon campaign-despite the $2,500
committee contribution limit per candidate-and the President reciprocating by directing the
Department of Agriculture to install price supports favorable to the milk industry. Id. at 839 n.36.
33. The Court also upheld the aggregate contribution limit of $25,000 per election cycle.
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 38. While holding that the aggregate limit does not significantly restrict the
freedom of association, the Court found the aggregate limit useful to prevent contributors from
circumventing per candidate contribution limits. Id.
34.
35.

See Buckley, 519 F.2d at 853.
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48.
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practical perception of corruption, the Court focused on the theory that
spending less money on candidates "necessarily reduces the quantity of
expression by restricting the number of issues 36discussed, the depth of their
exploration, and the size of audience reached.,
To prove its point, the Court contradicted itself and relied on the quid
pro quo principle that it rejected when reviewing appearance of corruption
of direct contributions. The Court decided that "independent expenditures
may well provide little assistance to the candidate's campaign" without
prearrangement and coordination. 37 After discussing how evidence of quid
pro quo is too high of a standard with regard to direct contributions, the
Court inexplicably required proof of a prearranged agreement in the case of
indirect contributions. 38 Hence, "independent advocacy [in favor of a
candidate] does not presently appear to pose dangers of real or apparent
to those identified with large campaign
corruption comparable
39
contributions."
The Court also did not address the fact that the appearance of
corruption stems from candidates who represent the interests of a rich
minority simply by receiving more funds. The Court did not aim to prevent
appearance of corruption that comes from inequality. On the contrary, the
Buckley Court held that "the concept that government may restrict the
the relative
speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance
40
Amendment."
First
the
to
foreign
wholly
is
voice of others
In essence, Buckley limited how much election money a candidate can
choose to spend himself, without limiting how much money a candidate
can receive. So, the Court created the rule, but chose not to foreclose the
loopholes that swallow the rule itself. By treating the act of paying
candidates' bills as speech, the Court extended constitutional protection to
what otherwise smelled like potential bribery. After Buckley, it became
much harder to fight against appearance of corruption in politics because of
this First Amendment backdrop. But the saga continued in Citizens United.

36.
37.

Id. at 19.
Id.at 47.

38. See id.("The absence of prearrangement and coordination of an expenditure with the
candidate or his agent not only undermines the value of the expenditure to the candidate, but also
alleviates the danger that expenditures will be given as a quid pro quo for improper commitments
from the candidate.").
39.

Id.at 46.

40.

Id.at 48-49 (emphasis added).
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Citizens United and Rights of Corporations in Politics

In Citizens United, the Court returned to Buckley and the appearance
of corruption with respect to election contributions by corporations.
Specifically, the Court dealt with a statute that prohibited corporations from
spending money on behalf of candidates within sixty days of a general
election. 41 This was the same issue the Buckley Court addressed, except the
focus in Citizens United was on corporate, rather than personal, money in
politics. Here, the Court again relied on the First Amendment in its inquiry
supported largely by the precedent in Buckley.42 But this time, the Court
stated that, as a self-evident truth, the "First Amendment has its fullest and
most urgent application to speech uttered during a campaign for political
office. 43 Again, those fighting against the appearance of corruption had to
face steep First Amendment scrutiny. The Court held that a corporation
had the same rights as a natural person when it came to spending money on
candidates. 44
The issue in Citizens United concerned only the limit on corporate
expenditures because the Buckley limit on direct contributions had already
applied to corporations.4 5 For purposes of its First Amendment analysis,
the Court did not perceive corporations' involvement in politics as a means
to generate and secure their own wealth. Instead, the Court continued
basing its reasoning on the abstract theory that corporate money is a form
of political speech where "the speaker is an association that has taken on
the corporate form. ' 4 6 This allowed the Court to ignore the inherent
appearance of corruption that comes from profit-seeking entities with a lot
47
of cash and an aversion to regulation engaging in politics.
The Court was deferential to Buckley in divorcing the appearance of
corruption from corporate campaign expenditures. 48 The concept of quid
pro quo corruption again governed the discussion. The Court explained,
"Limits on independent expenditures ... have a chilling effect extending
beyond the Government's interest in preventing quid pro quo corruption.
41. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 337 (2010).
42. See id at 339, 349 (holding that the "prohibition on corporate independent expenditures
is thus a ban on speech" and asserting that "[ihf the First Amendment has any force, it prohibits
Congress from fining or jailing citizens, or associations of citizens for simply engaging in
political speech").
43. Id. at 339 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
44.
45.

Id.at 365.
Id. at 345.

46. Id.at 348-49.
47. See id.at 351 ("It is irrelevant for purposes of the First Amendment that corporate funds
may have little or no correlation to the public's support for the corporation's political ideas.").
48.

Id.at 356.
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The anticorruption interest is not sufficient to displace the [corporate]
speech in question here. 49
The Court also defined the appearance of corruption more narrowly by
focusing on the appearance of quid pro quo corruption-bribes being
exchanged for political favors-ignoring the fact that politicians may favor
the interests of those who sponsor their political campaign without a formal
quid pro quo arrangement. 50 "The fact that [corporations] may have
influence over or access to elected officials does not mean that these
officials are corrupt: Favoritism and influence are not avoidable in
representativepolitics."5' In other words, the Court was willing to accept
the appearance of corruption as long as it was not traditional bribery, for
"[i]ngratiation and access, in any event, is not corruption. 52 Spending
to
money on political campaigns, even by corporations, thus "does not lead
53
or create appearance of quidpro quo corruption" in the United States.
The Court refused to accept the idea that "ingratiation" by
corporations alone creates appearance of corruption without the showing of
a quid pro quo arrangement. The Court missed the point by focusing on
generalities, like that "[m]any people can trace their funds to
corporations... in the form of dividends, interest, or salary, 54 and that
most U.S. corporations are not so rich: "more than 75% of corporations...
have less than $1 million in receipts per year.' ' 55 But the appearance of
corruption is associated with the rich minority of corporations, and
politicians should be accountable to the general public, even if corporations
sponsor politicians' campaigns. The Court's comparison of politicians to
salaried employees of corporations shows the Court's disregard for the

Id. at 357.
50. Id. at 359 ("When Buckley identified a sufficiently important governmental interest in
preventing corruption or appearance of corruption, that interest was limited to quid pro quo
corruption.").
51. Id. (emphasis added); see also McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 297 (2003) (Kennedy,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("It is in the nature of an elected representative to
favor certain policies, and, by necessary corollary, to favor the voters and contributors who
support those policies. It is well understood that a substantial and legitimate reason, if not the
only reason, to cast a vote for, or to make a contribution to, one candidate over another is that the
candidate will respond by producing those political outcomes the supporter favors. Democracy is
premised on responsiveness. Quidpro quo corruption has been, until now, the only agreed upon
conduct that represents the bad form of responsiveness and presents a justiciable standard with a
relatively clear limiting principle: Bad responsiveness may be demonstrated by pointing to a
relationship between an official and a quid.").
49.

52.

Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 360.

53.
54.
55.

Id.
Id. at351.
Id. at 354.
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appearance of corruption in the United States. But the Court did not
associate corporate campaign finance with appearance of corruption.
Instead, the Court washed its hands by stating that "[p]olitical speech is so
ingrained in our culture that speakers find ways to circumvent campaign
56
finance laws."
The Court thus disposed of the limit on corporate political spending by
ignoring the vast wealth of the donors, and instead, made the election laws
apply equally to both individuals and corporations. The high quid pro quo
bar on appearance of corruption was reinforced while the corporate identity
And the corporate wealth became irrelevant because
was ignored.
"wealthy individuals and unincorporated associations can spend unlimited
amounts of money on independent expenditures. 57 The concern with
individual wealth skewing politics was later addressed in McCutcheon.
C.

McCutcheon and Aggregate Contributions Limits

In McCutcheon, the Court struck down limits on total contributions
during an election cycle. McCutcheon, the appellant in the case wanted to
contribute money to more members of his political party and more political
action committees ("PACs") than the law allowed. 58 The law limited the
aggregate contribution limit to $123,000 per election, 59 which was too little
for McCutcheon. If the law were to be struck down, McCutcheon figured,
a wealthy citizen could potentially contribute up to $3.5 million to his
favorite group of candidates.6 ° So McCutcheon challenged the law to
enable the wealthy elite, like himself, to contribute more money to groups
of political candidates they supported. The Court once again relied on the
First Amendment to strike down the contribution limit that protected
against the perception of corruption.

56.
57.

Id. at 364.
Id. at 356.
58. McCutchcon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct.1434, 1442-43 (2014).
59. Prior to the ruling, a single donor could give a maximum of up to $2,600 directly to
eighteen candidates, as well as up to $74,600 to political parties and PACs. The $123,200
maximum aggregate limit pre-McCutcheon is thus the sum of $48,600 contributed to candidates
directly plus $74,600 contributed to political parties and PACs. McCutcheon v. FEC-2014
ElectoralImpacts, CONGRESS.ORG (Apr. 3, 2014), http://congress.org/2014/04/03/mccutchcon-vfec-2014-electoral-impacts/.
60. Andy Kroll, The Supreme CourtJust Gutted Another Campaign Fin. Law. Here's What
Happened, MOTHER JONES (Apr. 2, 2014), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2014/03/
supreme-court-mccutcheon-citizens-united (last visited Oct. 23, 2015). Note that $3.5 million is
the maximum aggregate amount of contributions that divided between individual candidates,
political action committees, and political parties. The $3.5 million cap still exists because of
individual contribution limits upheld in Buckley.
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The Court reiterated its holding in Buckley, holding that the First
Amendment is not concerned with inequality in political expression. 6' The
Constitution should not limit the contributions of some to empower the
voice of others. 62 In other words, while the U.S. Constitution protects
against certain kinds of inequality, like racial 63 or gender 64 inequality, the
Constitution is not concerned with overcoming financial inequality and its
In addressing the obvious perception of
political repercussions. 65
corruption that comes from further empowering the politically motivated
elite, the Court further held that the First Amendment "surely protects
campaign speech despite popular opposition." 66 Accordingly, the standard
in judging perception of corruption once
again centers around requiring the
67
proof of a quid pro quo arrangement.
The Court held that spending excessive sums of money on elections is
not quid pro quo corruption: excessive spending only provides better access
68
to certain candidates.
But the United States "[g]overnment may not seek
to limit the appearance of mere influence or access., 69 The only clear
appearance of corruption that may be regulated comes from "financial
contributions to particular candidates," not contributions to groups of
candidates, according to the Supreme Court.7 °
The Court did not discuss the core concern of the aggregate limit
law-that the politically motivated elite may not only want to put a like-

61. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1450 ("No matter how desirable it may seem, it is not an
acceptable governmental objective to 'level the playing field,' or to 'level electoral opportunities,'
or to 'equalize the financial resources of candidates."').
62. Id. at 1436 (holding that the First Amendment "may not, however, regulate
contributions simply to reduce the amount of money in politics, or to restrict the political
participation of some in order to enhance the relative influence of others").
63. See Loving v. Virginia., 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (holding that "the Equal Protection
Clause demands that racial classifications . .. be subjected to the most rigid scrutiny" (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
64. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (holding that "statutory classifications
that distinguish between males and females are subject to scrutiny under the Equal Protection
Clause" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
65. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1450 ("No matter how desirable it may seem, it is not an
acceptable governmental objective to 'level the playing field,' or to 'level electoral opportunities,'
or to 'equalize the financial resources of candidates.' The First Amendment prohibits such
legislative attempts to 'fine-tune' the electoral process, no matter how well intentioned." (internal
citations omitted)).
66. Id. at 1441.
67. Id. at 1450 ("Congress may target only a specific type of corruption-'quid pro quo'
corruption.").
68.
69.
70.

Id.
Id. at 1451.
Id. at 1450 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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minded individual in power, but also seek to occupy the majority of
Congress with favored politicians. The aggregate limit was designed to
prevent big money from capturing the majority of candidates in a
Congressional election, not just guaranteeing the loyalty of an individual
candidate. 71 Having "influence [on] or access" to many representatives is
much more effective in passing favorable legislation than having close ties
to a single representative. But the Court did not perceive appearance of
corruption here, and instead focused on how ineffective aggregate
72
contribution limits are at circumventing individual contribution limits.
After MeCutcheon, the Supreme Court became uninterested in
preventing the appearance of corruption. The high constitutional speech
protection that the Court repeatedly granted to various types of political
spending prevents future plaintiffs from challenging appearance of
corruption in American politics. Further, even if a campaign-finance
limitation does not impermissibly impinge the freedom of speech, it is still
nearly impossible to prove the quid pro quo bribery component when
claiming the appearance of corruption. Appearance of corruption means
that individuals with unequal wealth have unequal access to politicians.
But, after Citizens United and McCutcheon, this inequality is deemed
constitutionally permissible in the United States.
D.

Results

With aggregate direct and expenditure limits struck down, and
standards to corruption solidified at quid pro quo, Americans are
concerned. During the 2012 congressional election, two years after the
Citizens United decision, most of the winners raised the lion's share of their
campaign cash from super-PACs, 73 which are largely funded by
corporations and other large donors. In 2012, nearly 60% of all super-PAC

R. SAM GARRETT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43334, CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTION
71.
LIMITS: SELECTED QUESTIONS ABOUT MCCUTCHEON AND POLICY ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 4

(2014) ("Essentially, Congress established the existing individual limits at a threshold at which it
believed struck a balance between permitting donors to support their favored candidates while
also limiting potential corruption. Support for the aggregate limits generally rests with a concept
known as the "anti-circumvention rationale," which holds that an overall limit is necessary to
protect the individual limits. Supporters generally argue that if a contributor were permitted to
make an unlimited number of contributions, it would make little difference that each individual
contribution were capped. Such donors might still enjoy outsized influence in elections and
policymaking, therefore potentially corrupting both.").
72. See id. at 1446-47 (giving examples of how one cannot use aggregate limits to
circumvent individual limits).
73. Adam Lionz & Blair Bowie, Billion-Dollar Democracy: The Unprecedented Role of
Money in 2012 Elections, DEMOS (Jan. 17, 2013), http://www.dcmos.org/publication/billiondollar-dcmocracy-unprecedented-role-mony-2012-elections.
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funding came from just 159 contributors.74 Over 93% of cash spent on the
election by super-PACs came from 0.0011% of the American population.75
During the 2012 presidential election, the top thirty-two super-PAC donors
gave as much money as the next 3.7 million smaller donors.7 6 Sheldon
Adelson, the CEO of the Las Vegas Sands, the biggest casino company in
the United States, reportedly contributed $150 million in the 2012
election.7 7 That is not exactly the "lone pamphleteer or street corner orator
in the Tom Paine mold" that the First Amendment aimed to protect. 78 Yet,
under the strict constitutional scrutiny employed by the Supreme Court,
excessive lobbying is hardly perceived as corruption is the United States.
The Court decided McCutcheon right in the middle of the 2014
congressional election. Between April and July 2014, when the Supreme
Court published the decision, donors contributed over $50.2 million in
extra cash that would have been impermissible before the decision. 79 Of
that amount, $11.6 million was contributed just by 310 rich donors.8 ° Also,
fueled by the Citizens United decision, spending by outside groups on
candidates nearly doubled in only four years after the decision.8 1 Outside
groups provided 47% of the total cash spent on candidates-while
candidates' own efforts, limited by the caps on direct contributions,
produced 41% of the total cash they spent. Further, by September 2014,
just two billionaires-Charles and David Koch-have sponsored over
44,000 television advertisements (or 10% of total election advertisements
aired in the first half of 2014) aimed at giving the Republicans control of
the Senate. 82 This is the direct effect of these two decisions: elections
became even costlier.

74.

Kroll, supra note 60.

Lionz & Bowie, supra note 73.
Id
77. Peter H. Stone, Sheldon Adelson Spent Far More on Campaign Than Previously
Known, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 2, 2012, 12:00 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/
12/03/sheldon-adelson-2012-election n 2223589.html.
78. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1448 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
75.
76.

79. Matea Gold, Wealthy Political Donors Seize on New Latitude to Give to Unlimited
Candidates, WASH. POST (Sept. 2, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/wealthypolitical-donors-seize-on-new-latitude-to-give-to-unlimited-candidates/2014/09/01/d94aeefa2f8c- 11 e4-bb9b-997ae96fad33_story.html?hpid=zl.
80.

Id.

81.

Gabrielle Levy, How Citizens United Has Changed Politics in 5 Years, U.S. NEWS &

WORLD REPORT (Jan. 21, 2015, 12:26 PM), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/01/21/5years-later-citizens-united-has-remade-us-politics.
82. Michael Hiltzik, The November Election Is Already Drowning in Big, Secret Donations,
L.A. TIMES (Sept. 5, 2014, 2:41 PM), http://www.latimes.com/business/hiltzik/la-fi-mh-bigsecret-money-20140905-column.html.
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The 2016 presidential election is expected to cost $5 billion.83 As of
October 2015, more than a year before the election day, candidates have
already raised $290.4 million through direct contributions and another
$277.8 million in donations-through super-PACs and independent
expenditures, which are not subject to limitations after McCutcheon. This
outside spending by large donors provides a significant financial advantage
to candidates that are not actually supported by the majority. By October
15, 2015, Hillary Clinton, who received approval from over 50% of
Democratic voters,84 has raised $77.5 million in direct contributions due to
85
Jeb
her popularity, but only $20.3 million from PACs and super-PACs.
Bush, on the other hand, a far less popular candidate supported by barely
8% of Republican voters,86 has raised a mere $24.8 million in direct
contributions, but an astounding $108.5 million from PACs and superPACs who represent business interests supporting Bush.87 This is how
wealth can impact elections in the United States after the Citizens United
and McCutcheon decisions.

II. Political Contributions and Expenditures in Europe
Now that the points of comparison are established-individual and
aggregate direct contributions, and individual and corporate independent
expenditures-the new U.S. laws can be compared to European campaigncontribution laws. This comparison will help determine whether "Citizens
Unitedand McCutcheon were not just bad law but bad history.
A.

Perception of Corruption in the European Union

The European Commission views corruption as "one of the biggest
challenges facing Europe.,, 89 Europeans are just as prone as Americans to
think their country is corrupt: 76% of Europeans consider corruption

83. Amie Parnes & Kevin Cirilli, The $5 Billion Presidential Campaign?,THE HILL (Jan.
21, 2015, 4:54 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/ballot-box/presidcntial-races/230318-the-5-billioncampaign.
84. 2016 Presidential Election Polls, THE POLITICS AND ELECTIONS PORTAL,
http://2016.election-polls.org/ (last visited Oct. 23, 2015).
85. Which Presidential Candidates Are Winning the Money Race, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 22,
2016), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/201 6/us/clections/clcction-201 6-campaign-money-rac
e.html? rl.
86. 2016 PresidentialElection Polls,supra note 84.
87. Which Presidential Candidates Are Winning the Money Race, supra note 85.
88. Zephyr Teachout, Corruption in America, HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS, http://www.
hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674659988 (last visited Apr. 7, 2016).
89.

CORRUPTION REPORT, EUROPEAN COMMISSION 2 (2014).
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widespread in Europe, compared to 79% of Americans. 91 But this
perception varies greatly among European countries-from 99% of Greeks
believing that corruption is commonplace in their country to just 54% of
Swedes. 92 Because the law varies within the European Union, it is helpful
to compare country by country.
In 2012, Transparency International released a report, Money, Politics,
Power: Corruption Risks in Europe,93 highlighting the performance of
different countries with regard to lobbying and appearance of corruption.
The report illustrated how lobbying laws vary among different European
countries, explaining the disparity in perception of corruption across
Europe. Of the twenty-five European countries assessed, two countriesSweden and Switzerland-"lack any binding rules to regulate political
donations." 94 Ironically, Transparency International ranked Sweden and
Switzerland as the fourth and fifth cleanest countries in the world
respectively in its 2014 Corruption Perception Index, while the United
States lagged behind in seventeenth place.95 The report explained the
paradox by stating that "political party financing.., is a particularly high'low corruption contexts'
risk area, which even countries often described as 96
have not managed to insulate themselves against."
The report identified corporate and large individual campaign
contributions as "types of donations considered to be more prone to
corruption." 97 By 2012, eight out of twenty-five European countries
completely banned corporate donations to political candidates 98-the
opposite of what the United States did in Citizens United. However, these
99
countries provide "generous public funding" to their elections

90. Id.at 6.
91. Jon Clifton, Americans Less Satisfied with Freedom, GALLUP (July 1, 2014),
http://www.gallup.com/poll/172019/americans-less-satisfied-freedom.aspx. Seventy-nine percent
of Americans replied "yes" when asked, "Is corruption widespread throughout the government in
this country, or not?" Id.
92.

CORRUPTION REPORT, supranote 89, at 6.

93.
See generally TRANSPARENCY INT'L, MONEY, POLITICS, POWER: CORRUPTION RISKS
IN EUROPE (2012) [hereinafter CORRUPTION RISKS IN EUROPE].

94.

Id.at 22.

95. CorruptionPerception Index 2014: Results, TRANSPARENCY INT'L, https://www.trans
parency.org/cpi20l4/results (last visited Oct. 23, 2015). Note that this ranking is out of 175
countries and territories in the world.
96. CORRUPTION RISKS IN EUROPE, supra note 93, at 22.
97. Id.; see also id. at 23 (explaining that "limiting corporate and individual donations [is
necessary] to ensure democracy is 'not for sale').
98. Id.at 24. These countries are Belgium, Estonia, France, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania,
Poland, and Portugal. Id.
99.

Id.(emphasis added).
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°

something that U.S. candidates largely do not utilize.'0 About half of the
°
European countries do not have ceilings on individual contributions,'
which makes the United States Supreme Court's decision in Buckley-to
limit direct contributions out of fear of corruption-praiseworthy. "In the
UK, the absence of any limit on the amount individuals or corporations can
donate contributes to the on-going erosion of public confidence in the
political process."' 10 2 Similar to the Supreme Court's decision in Buckley,
the Transparency International report did not find a correlation
between
03
independent expenditures and perception of corruption.'
To compare U.S. campaign finance law with that of the European
Union's, France and the United Kingdom were selected as illustrations
because both countries have sophisticated legal systems but approach
campaign financing differently from each other and from the United States.
The comparison is limited to the substance of the Citizens United and
McCutcheon decisions: direct contribution limits by individuals and
corporations, aggregate contribution limits, and independent expenditure
limits.
B.

Campaign Financing Laws in France

Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index ranked
France as the twenty-sixth cleanest country in the European Union and
Western Europe, with a score of sixty-nine out of one hundred.1°4
However, with respect to the transparency and integrity of campaign
finance, France received a much lower score of twenty-seven out of one

100. See Public Financing of Elections (U.S.), OPEN CONGRESS, https://www.opencongress
.org/wiki/Public_financing of elections_%28U.S.%29 (last visited Oct. 23, 2015) ("Candidates
have increasingly moved away from accepting public funds, as they can raise more money
throughout the primary, nomination, and general election processes through strictly private
contributions."). Note that, in the United States, public funding is available only to presidential
candidates-but not in Congressional elections. See Quick Answers to Public Funding Questions,
FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, http://www.fcc.gov/ans/answersjpublic_funding.shtml (last
visited Oct. 23, 2015).
101. CORRUPTION RISKS IN EUROPE, supra note 93, at 24, 54 (Czech Republic, Denmark,
Estonia, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Slovakia, Sweden, Switzerland, and
United Kingdom).
102. Id.at 24.
103. See id. at 54-57 (limiting areas of corruption analysis to banbans on undisclosed
contributions and corporate donations, ceilings on individual contributions, lobbying disclosures,
and whistleblowcr laws).
104. Corruption Perception Index 2014: Results, TRANSPARENCY INT'L, https://www.trans
parency.org/cpi2014/results (last visited Oct. 23, 2015).
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hundred. 10 5 The score is low largely due to the lack of transparency in
campaign finance in France. But the score is not low because of the loose
campaign finance 'laws:
French "law strictly regulates private funding of
06
political activities."
In France, aggregate direct contributions per election are limited to
C4,600,107 or approximately $5,070 1 8-compared to $3.5 million in the
United States after McCutcheon. Corporations are also distinguished from
natural persons under the French campaign finance laws' 09-while
corporations in the United States are treated as individuals after Citizens
United. "No legal entity [i.e., a corporation] is allowed to participate in
financing a political candidate unless the legal entity is a political party or a
political group.""l 0
Contributions by foreign corporations are also
prohibited in France,' while the Court in Citizens United refused to ban
foreign corporate contributions in the United States. 1 12 The limit on
political party financing is E7,500,113 or approximately $8,265,14 though
political parties
themselves are not limited in how much they can contribute
1 5
to a candidate.
Further, France limits expenditures, unlike the United States after
Buckley and Citizens United. The limitations vary, depending on the type
of expenditure and election. The French Constitutional Council approved
the expenditure limit as a means to counteract the appearance of corruption
in politics-freedom of speech was not an issue." 6
Because the
Constitutional Council is the highest authority on constitutional matters, no

105. TRANSPARENCY INT'L FRANCE, TRANSPARENCY AND INTEGRITY OF LOBBYING: A
CHALLENGE FOR DEMOCRACY, CITIZEN ASSESSMENT ON LOBBYING IN FRANCE 7 (2014)
[hereinafter TRANSPARENCY INT'L FRANCE].

106. Id. at 18.
107. Id; see also Campaign Finance: France, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, http://www.loc.gov/
law/help/campaign-financc/france.php#funding (last visited Oct. 23, 2015) (explaining that while
E4,600 is the aggregate limit, direct contributions per candidate are further limited by total
expenditure per candidate).
108. Date of currency conversion: Oct. 23, 2015.
109.
and legal
110.
11.

Campaign Finance: France, supra note 107 (distinguishing between physical persons
entities).
Id.
Id.

112. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 337 (2010) (striking down the statute that
applied to foreign corporations).
113.

TRANSPARENCY INT'L FRANCE, supra note 105, at 18.

114. Date of currency conversion: Oct. 23, 2015.
115. Campaign Finance: France, supra note 107 (Note: The ceilings on campaign
expenditures per candidate, however, apply to political parties too).
116. Id.
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French lower court could challenge the expenditure limit." 7 The French
Constitution does not protect political donations and expenditures, which is
in stark contrast to the United States, where the Supreme Court
characterized campaign financing as political speech protected by the First
Amendment in Buckley, Citizens United, and McCutcheon. Because
French courts do not provide constitutional protection to campaign
financing, French law has the power to significantly limit campaign
expenditures to prevent the appearance of corruption.
In French presidential elections, independent expenditures by third
parties supporting the candidates are completely prohibited," 8 compared to
unlimited independent expenditures in the United States post Buckley.
Direct expenditures-payments by the candidates themselves using funds
contributed by donors-are also limited in France, unlike in the United
States.1 9 The expenditure ceiling limits direct spending by a presidential
candidate to E16.2 million ($17.85 million' 20 ) in the first ballot and E21.6
million ($23.8 million 2 1) in the second ballot,' 22 significantly reducing
how much money is necessary to win a French presidential election.
Nicolas Sarkozy managed to win the 2007 French presidential election with
E21,038,893, or approximately $23.1 million, 123 in candidate expenditures
and zero in independent expenditures. 124 To compare, it took President
Barack Obama about $730 million in direct expenditures' 25 and nearly

117.

Id.
118. Id. ("[A]ll forms of paid commercial advertisement through the press or by any
audiovisual means during the three months preceding an election are prohibited. The state
provides free access to public radio and television for political advertisement for a certain amount
of time during the official election campaigns.").
119. Cf Buckley v. Valco, 424 U.S. 2-4 (1976) (holding that it is proper for the Government
to regulate only allocation of public funding to an election candidate-not the candidate's own
funding); see also Presidential Spending Limits for 2008, FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION,
http://www.fec.gov/pagesfbrochures/pubfund limits_2008.shtml (last visited Apr. 7, 2015)
(General Election Limit was $84.1 million per candidate in 2008 if the candidate uses public
funds for campaigning). But no major candidate in the previous election opted in for public
funding-unlike in France, where there is an expenditure limit on spending regardless of where
the money came from. See CampaignFinance: France,supra note 107 (emphasis added).
120. Date of Currency Conversion: Oct. 23, 2015.
Date of Currency Conversion: Oct. 23, 2015.
121.
122. Campaign Finance: France, supra note 107 (Note: These numbers are for the 2007
presidential election and are rounded up to the nearest hundred thousand).
123. Date of Currency Conversion: Oct. 23, 2015.
124. Date of Currency Conversion: Oct. 23, 2015.
125. 2008 PresidentialElection, OPEN SECRETS, https://www.opensecrcts.org/pres08/ (last
visited Oct. 23, 2015).
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$150 million in independent expenditures1 26 to win the 2008 presidential
election in the United States. Thus, the presence of big money and
unlimited expenditures affects
the election process in the United States
12 7
much more than in France.
In French parliamentary elections, expenditures are also limited. Like
in French presidential elections, independent expenditures on parliamentary
candidates are forbidden and direct expenditures by candidates are limited.
The limit on direct expenditures in a parliamentary election is calculated by
using a formula that depends on the district size. It starts with a fixed base
of E38,000 per candidate, plus £0.15 per each resident of a district,
increased by a multiplier of 1.18.128 So, for a district the size of
California's Seventh Congressional District, which includes suburbs of
Sacramento with total population of around 721,042,129 the candidate
expenditure ceiling in France would be C165,624, or approximately
$182,109,30 per candidate plus no independent expenditures. By contrast,
during the 2014 House election, Congressman Amerish Bera won the
California's Seventh District election after spending nearly $4.36 million in
direct contributions with another $6.32 million provided in independent
expenditures. 32 While in France, every candidate is on equal grounds
when it comes to campaign finance, in the United States, the sky is the
limit-and it becomes apparent when looking at the cost of election
victories.
Thus, while the United States Supreme Court deemed it impermissible
to "level the playing field" by "equaliz[ing] financial resources of
candidates,"' 133 the French did exactly the opposite. In France, both

126. 2008 Independent Expenditure Summaries, FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, http://
www.fec.gov/press/press2008/2008indexp/2008presindepexpend.html
(last visited Oct. 23,
2015).
127. See id.Obama, as the winning candidate, spent more than twice as much as the runner
up on the election: $730 million, compared to $333 million by John McCain. Id.The third place
candidate, Ralph Nader, spent only $4 million of his election funds. Id. While correlation is not
causation, winning in the United States is surely correlated with higher spending than in France.
128. Campaign Finance:France,supra note 107.
129. Fast Facts for Congress, UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/
fastfacts/ (select "California" in the drop-down menu 1; then select "Congressional District 7" in
the drop-down menu 2) (last visited Oct. 23, 2015).
130.

Date of Currency Conversion: Oct. 23, 2015.

131.

House and Senate Elections, FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, http://www.fec.gov/

portal/house senate.shtml (click on "House and Senate Map" hyperlink; then type in "Bera" in
the "Search by Candidate Name" text box; then click "Go") (last visited Oct. 23, 2015).
132. THE CAMPAIGN FINANCE INSTITUTE, TABLE 1: 2014 HOUSE GENERAL ELECTION
RACES BY TOTAL AMOUNT OF INDEPENDENT SPENDING (2015).

133.

McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S.Ct.1434, 1450(2014).
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contributions and expenditures are effectively capped. While, in the United
States, the more a candidate raises-both in direct contributions and
independent expenditures-the more a candidate can spend on winning the
campaign. Also, corporate contributions and unlimited expenditures,
which are wholly permissible in the United States after Citizens United and
Buckley, are altogether banned in France. This has the effect of reducing
the appearance of corruption in France and making the U.S. political
system seem entangled with big money. This is where the legal standard
for appearance of corruption plays a practical role: while winning a
campaign still costs money in France, it costs much less than in the United
States.
Further, because French courts leveled the political playing field, the
appearance of corruption is far less prevalent in France. French laws are
tough on the appearance of even slight corruption, not just full quid pro quo
bribery-hence the ban on corporate contributions. Political contributions
in France are also not entangled with deep-rooted constitutional
Elections and
protections, unlike the U.S. campaign finance laws.
campaign financing are viewed more as an administrative procedure than
134
as speech. As a result, elections are brief, and safeguards are strong.
Further, appearance of impartiality takes priority over protecting the power
of money. This is why the state plays such a big role in administering and
conducting elections,' 35 a characteristic common to some other European
countries as well. This is a different avenue of viewing money in politics.
Under this view, it is possible to extend stronger protection to the vote of
the poor and unpopular-unlike in the United States, where the right to
spend money on politics is protected under the Constitution.
C.

Campaign Financing in the United Kingdom

The United Kingdom ranks as the fourteenth cleanest country in
Europe, and also holds the fourteenth least corrupt place in the world,
according to the Corruption Perception Index, which is slightly above the
United States in seventeenth place.' 36 Nevertheless, 59% of U.K. citizens
believed that the British government is run by a few big entities acting in
their own best interests, 67% considered British political parties to be
corrupt, and 55% felt that the British Parliament was either corrupt or

Campaign Finance: France,supra note 107.
135. Id. ("Campaign accounts are auditcd by special commission. Candidates whose
campaign accounts are certified may be reimbursed up to 50% of their expenses by the state.").
136. Corruption Perception Index 2014: Results, TRANSPARENCY INT'L, https://www.trans
parency.org/cpi2014/results (last visited Oct. 23, 2015).
134.
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extremely corrupt.1 37 The campaign finance laws in the United Kingdom
are also much less favorable to serving private interests than the laws in
France. As a result, political party financing has been at the heart38 of many
corruption scandals in the United Kingdom over the past decade.'
In the United Kingdom there are no limits on individual donationseither to individual candidates or to political parties.1 39 By comparison, the
Buckley Court upheld a $1,000 individual contribution limit in the United
States, which has grown to $2,700 per candidate or $33,400 per political
party in 2015. 14 British law, however, justifies the absence of a
contribution limit by setting an expenditure limit in Parliamentary
elections. The spending limits apply to both how much a political party
can spend on their candidates and how much an individual candidate can
spend on his or her own campaign.
The direct expenditures limit for political parties nominating
candidates to the British Parliament is the greater of £990,000 ($1.5
times the number of contested seats (up
million 14 1) or £30,000 ($46,016 142)
to 632 seats in the British Parliament). 43 The average direct expenditure
limit for individual parliamentary candidates is £16,050 ($24,619144) for a
"short campaign" and £26,450 ($40,571 145)
for a "long campaign."' 146 The
British Electoral Commission set these limits to ensure that the general
electorate can afford to participate and to prevent appearance of
corruption. 47 While prevention of appearance of corruption was only the
rhetoric in the Buckley and Citizens United decisions, the United Kingdom
137. TRANSPARENCY INT'L UK, LIFTING THE LID ON LOBBYING: THE HIDDEN EXERCISE OF
POWER AND INFLUENCE IN THE UK 12 (2015) [hereinafter LOBBYING IN THE UK] (reporting the
Global Corruption Barometer findings).
138.

Id. at 17.
139. Id.;see also Campaign Finance: United Kingdom, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS,
http://www.loc.gov/law/help/eampaign-finance/uk.php (last visited Oct. 23, 2015).
140. Contribution Limits for 2015-2016 Federal Elections, FEDERAL ELECTION
(last
http://www.fec.gov/pages/brochures/contrib.shtml#ContributionLimits
COMMISSION,
visited Oct. 23, 2015).
141. Date of Conversion: Oct. 23, 2015.
142.

Date of Conversion: Oct. 23, 2015.

143.

THE ELECTORAL COMM'N,

UK PARLIAMENTARY

GENERAL ELECTION 2015 6-7

(2015). Note that there is a separate election for Northern Ireland with similar limits, but for
simplicity concerns it is not discussed in this note.
144. Date of Conversion: Oct. 23, 2015.
145. Date of Conversion: Oct. 23, 2015.
146.

THE ELECTORAL COMM'N, CANDIDATE SPENDING LIMIT REVIEW 3, 6 (2014).

Note

that these are average spending limits. In the United Kingdom, the spending limit varies by a
number of electors. But this complication is unnecessary for the general analysis of this note that
tries to compare apples to apples.
147.

ld. at 4.
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actually implemented laws to "level the playing field," which the United
States Supreme Court explicitly refused to do in Buckley. Yet, the apparent
intent of leveling the playing field did not translate into reality in the
United Kingdom.
Despite the expenditure limit, the lack of contribution limit is
problematic from the standpoint of preventing the appearance of
corruption. Chandu Krishnan, the executive director of Transparency
International United Kingdom, reiterated the concern of the Buckley Court
with regard to large contributions: "When donors are making contributions
exceeding £20,000 ($3 1,000)-and some are making donations well over
£250,000 ($390,000)-it's perfectly understandable you don't give away
that kind of money without expecting something in return.' ' 148
This
concern is warranted: between 2001 and 2010, nearly 60% of the £432
million ($662 million) donated to political parties came from individual
donations of more than £100,000 ($153,387). 149
To compare, the
appearance of corruption that stems from large individual contributions was
limited in the United States by the Buckley decision; now, individual
contributions to a political party is limited to $32,400 per party, per year.
After McCutcheon, however, a donor in the United States can circumvent
this limit by donating to as many individual candidates in a party as he or
she wishes 51 -but this is also an issue in the United Kingdom.
Because there are no individual contribution limits in the United
Kingdom, there is also no aggregate contribution limit,152 leaving British
law in sync with the U.S. law after the McCutcheon decision. While the
United States Supreme Court in McCutcheon explained that aggregate
limits existed only to stop circumvention of individual contribution
limits, 5 3 this line of reasoning is irrelevant in the United Kingdom because
there are no individual contribution limits to circumvent. British law also
does not address the greater concern of the dissenters in McCutcheon-that
without aggregate limits, the wealthy elite can elect their political party to

148. Thompson, supra note 14. Note that the dollar amounts in the quote arc based on 2012
conversion rates.
149. LOBBYING IN THE UK, supra note 137, at 17. Note also that loans, unlike donations, are
not subject to regulation. Id. In the first three months of 2014, political parties in the United
Kingdom received about £14 million in outright donations, and another £15 million in loans. Id.
Note that the conversion rate to U.S. dollars was based on the October 23, 2015 rate.
150.

GARRETT, supra note 71, at 3.

151. See id. (showing that the McCutcheon decision struck down the aggregate contribution
limit).
152. See generally Contribution Limits for 2015-2016 Federal Elections, supra note 140.
This is a corollary that is undisputed in the law.
153.

See McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S.Ct. 1439 (2014).
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occupy the whole legislature. And it shows: Liberal Democrats, the third
largest party in the House of Commons, received 40% of their cash
contributions over the past three years from just three wealthy
businessmen. 154 The United States, therefore, appears less corrupt when
compared to the United Kingdom, even after the two infamous decisions.
Corporations are also permitted to contribute to elections in the United
Kingdom, 155 just like in the United States post Citizens United. In fact,
British campaign finance law, like American law following Citizens
United, does not distinguish between natural persons and corporations
when it comes to political contributions.156 However, foreign corporations
57
and foreign individuals are banned from contributing to the election,
unlike in the United States. Because British law permits unlimited
corporate donations, corporations have been the top donors in British
elections between 2001 and 2014.158

Finally, independent expenditures by third parties are limited in the
United Kingdom, unlike in the United States after Buckley and Citizens
United. While paid political advertising in broadcast media, supported
largely by independent spending in the United States, is prohibited in the
United Kingdom, political parties receive a certain amount of airtime free
of charge. 59 The independent expenditures in the United Kingdom are
restricted to £500 ($767160) per person, for the limited purpose of
"presenting to the electors the candidate or his views, or the extent or
nature of his backing or disparaging of another candidate."' 161 Previously,
the United Kingdom had a much smaller independent expenditure limitjust £5 ($8) per person, per election-before the European Court of Human
Rights struck it down in Bowman v. United Kingdom. 162 In Bowman, the
European Court treated the limit on independent expenditure limit as a

154. LOBBYING INTHE UK, supra note 137, at 17.
155. Political Parties, Elections and Referendum Act, c. 41, § 54 (2000) (U.K.).
156. Id. (identifying individuals, companies, trade unions, building societies, partnerships,
and associations as permissible donors, as long as they are registered in the United Kingdom).
157. Id.
158. Donations and Loans Reported Every Quarter by Political Parties, THE ELECTORAL
COMM'N, http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/find-information-by-subject/political-parties-ca
mpaigning-and-donations/donations-and-loans-to-poIitica-parties/quartery-donations-and-loans
(last visited Apr. 10, 2015) (illustrating that between 2001 and 2004, individuals donated more
than £258 million, while companies, unincorporated associations, partnerships, and trade unions
have collectively donated close to £277 million).
159. Communications Act, c. 21, § 333 (2003).
160. Currency Conversion Date: Oct. 23, 2015.
161. Campaign Finance: United Kingdom, supra note 139.
162. See generally Bowman v. United Kingdom, 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 (1998).
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"restriction on freedom of expression."' 63 Similarly, in Buckley and
Citizens United, the United States Supreme Court treated such limit as a
restriction on freedom of speech. The European Court also explained that
it was not necessary to set an expenditure limit in order to secure "equality
between candidates,"' 64 whereas the Buckley Court held that establishing
objective at all when it
equality between candidates was not a government
65
came to preventing the appearance of corruption.'
The U.K. government responded to Bowman by increasing the limits
on independent expenditures that differentiate between "unrecognized" and
"recognized" third parties.
"Unrecognized" third parties-meaning,
individuals that want to financially assist political candidates without
revealing their identities-may only spend up to £500 ($767) on a
candidate per election.' 66 "Recognized third parties"-meaning those who
reveal their identities to the British government-may spend up to
£988,100 ($1,515,620) in the year leading to a parliamentary election in
favor of or against a particular candidate.' 67 While these numbers are large,
independent expenditures are unlimited in the United States after Buckley
and Citizens United.
These independent expenditure limits apply to both individuals and
corporations.1 68 These limits are necessary to promote "fairness between
competing candidates for election by preventing wealthy third parties from
campaigning for or against a particular candidate or issuing material which
necessitated the devotion of part of a candidate's election budget, which
169
was limited by law," as asserted by the British government in Bowman.
The fact that the British government reinstated the limits on independent
expenditure after the European Court struck them down illustrates that the
United Kingdom found expenditure limits necessary to prevent appearance
of corruption, unlike the United States Supreme Court.

163. Id. at1[33.
164. Id. at 1 37 ("Furthermore, the restriction on expenditure could not properly be said to
ensure equality between candidates, because they were already subject to inequalities depending
on whether or not they received the support of one of the major political panics, which were free
to spend unlimited amounts on campaigning at national level as long as they did not attempt to
promote or prejudice any particular candidate.").
165. Buckley v. Valco, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976).
166. Campaign Finance: United Kingdom, supra note 139 (citing PPERA §§ 88, 95 &
sched. 11).
167. Id.
168. Id. (noting that the United Kingdom does not distinguish between natural persons and
legal entities for the purpose of its election law).
169.

Bowman v. United Kingdom, 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. 4, 1136 (1998).
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Thus, the British campaign finance law appears to be almost a polar
opposite of the U.S. campaign finance law in addressing the appearance of
corruption. Unlike the U.S. law after Buckley, Citizens United, and
McCutcheon, the U.K. law limits campaign expenditures but does not
restrict contributions to political candidates. The British also aim to
combat the appearance of corruption by leveling the playing fieldsomething that the United States Supreme Court explicitly refused to do in
both Citizens United and McCutcheon, citing the freedom of political
speech. This shows that the British agree to limit the appearance of
corruption at the expense of limiting the freedom of political expressionwhile the American judicial system values the freedom to utilize one's
wealth in elections. Thus, elections in the United Kingdom do not cost
nearly as much as elections in the United States, even when taking into
account the comparable size of the two economies.I1°
Conclusion
In the United States, elections are expensive and the freedom to
participate in elections is vast. As illustrated in this note, campaign finance
law in the United States, following Citizens United and McCutcheon,
differs from European campaign finance law-but not by much.
It starts with the high degree of scrutiny that the United States
Supreme Court gives when reviewing money in politics. The Court views
campaign finance as speech, not just manner of speech, which is very
different from how European courts treat money in politics. As a result, the
Court has struck down nearly every limit to money in politics, except for
the most obvious direct contributions limit.
The Court also created a high bar for the perception of corruption: it
only recognizes the interest in preventing quid pro quo corruption and has
no interest in preventing the perception of corruption that stems from
income inequality. This differs from Europe, where the governments in
France and the United Kingdom are keen to put limits on any appearance of

170. Compare David Cowling, What PriceDemocracy? Counting the Cost of UK Elections,
BBC NEWS (Nov. 8, 2013), http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-24842147 (estimating that the
2010 U.K. Parliamentary election cost £113 million, or approximately $173 million) with The
Money Behind Elections, OPENSECRETS.ORG, https://www.opensecrcts.org/bigpicture/ (last
visited Oct. 23, 2015) (estimating that the 2010 Congressional election cost $3.6 billion). While
the Gross Domestic Product of the United States exceeded that of the United Kingdom by a factor
of six-and-a-half in 2010, the cost of the U.S. Congressional election in that same year exceeded
the cost of the British parliamentary election by a factor of twenty-one. See WORLD DEV.
INDICATORS DATABASE, GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 2010 1 (World Bank 2011) (stating that the
GDP of the United Kingdom was $2,246,079,000 in 2010, while the GDP of the United States
was $14,582,400,000).

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 43:4

corruption. Unlike Europe-where even corporate contributions are often
limited-and due to the strict First Amendment scrutiny, perception of
corruption is just not perceived as importantly in the United States.
Compared to many European countries, the United States still has
many restrictions on campaign financing.
However, most of these
countries with unrestricted money in politics are small countries. Large
economies, like France and the United Kingdom have more safeguards in
their respective campaign financing laws. These nations do not protect
giving cash to politicians as sacred speech, but rather treat elections as
administrative matters, where prevention of corruption serves as the
ultimate goal.
France and the United Kingdom also recognize the danger of
inequality in politics, which leads to the appearance of corruption, while
the United States does not limit inequality in politics. The election law
after Buckley, Citizens United, and McCutcheon protects the right of some
to spend much more than others on elections. As a result, American
elections cost disproportionately more than elections in the largest
European economies. Thus, while "[t]here is no right more basic in our
' 71
democracy than the right to participate in electing our political leaders,"'
to exercise this basic right apparently costs money.
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